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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to hear those matters originating out of the
Justice Court where the District Court has ruled on the constitutionality of a statute
or ordinance. See U.C.A. § 78-5-120(7) (current version at Utah Code Ann. §
78a-7-118(2008).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On November 30, 2006, Defendant Rio Davis appealed the conviction
of "maintaining a nuisance" entered in the Hyde Park Justice Court. See
Notice of Appeal. (Record P. 054).

2.

On March 29, 2007, Davis filed a Motion and Memorandum in the First
District Court to dismiss and quash his conviction based upon alleged
unconstitutionality of the Justice Court system. See Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Dismiss and Quash. (Record P. 072).

3.

On or about April 13, 2007. Davis filed a second Motion to Dismiss the
pending action based upon the alleged unconstitutionality of the Hyde
Park City nuisance ordinance. See Motion to Dismiss Pending Action.
(Record P. 098).

4.

On April 27. 2007. Plaintiff Hyde Park City filed an opposition to both
of Defendant's motions to dismiss. See Response to Motion to Dismiss
and Response to Motion to Dismiss and to Quash Conviction. (Record
pp. 119. 128).

]

On Jul) 30. 2007. the First District Court orally announced a decision
denying both of Davis' motions. See Minutes Ruling on Motion Notice.
(Record P. 141).
During the July 30. 2007 hearing, the Court directed Hyde Park City to
prepare a proposed order. Id.
The city prepared the order, circulated the order to Mr. Davis, and filed
the same with the Court. See generally, Objection to Plaintiffs Order
on Motion to Dismiss and to Quash Conviction. (Record P. 145).
On August 24, 2007. Davis filed an objection to Hyde Park's proposed
order. See Objection to Plaintiffs Order on Motion to Dismiss and to
Quash Conviction. (Record P. 145).
On September 28. 2007. Mr. Davis was tried and convicted in the
District Court for maintaining a nuisance. See Sentence. Judgment and
Commitment. (Record P. 153).
On October 11. 2007. Davis filed an objection to the Court*s verdict,
judgment and sentence on the nuisance conviction. See Objection to
Oral Verdict. Judgment and Sentence. (Record P. 154).
On October 15. 2007, Mr. Davis filed a Notice of Appeal to the Utah
Court of Appeals. See first notice of appeal. (Record P. 156).
The District Court having received objections to the decisions stated
oralh from the bench, and also receiving a notice of appeal from the
Defendant, never signed a final order denying defendant's motions

regarding constitutionality of the city nuisance ordinance and the
constitutionality of the justice court system. See, generally. Judgment
Roll and Index).
13.

On March 4, 2008, while awaiting a final signed order as to the
constitutional issues. Davis filed a Notice to Submit for Decision on its
Objection to the Oral Verdict Judgment and Sentence. See Notice to
Submit for Decision. (Record P. 177).

14.

On March 14, 2008, Mr. Davis filed another notice of appeal
("Amended Notice of Appeal"). See Amended Notice of Appeal.
(Record P. 187).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court lacks appellate jurisdiction because Defendant / Appellant

Jerald Rio Davis (hereinafter *;Mr. Davis" or uDavis") has not appealed a final
order from the District Court. The final judgment rule precludes a party from
taking an appeal from any orders that are not final. Mr. Davis has continued to
seek adjudication of his constitutional issues at the District Court level after filing
his appeal. The District Court has only made an oral pronouncement denying
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pending Action and Motion to Quash. Such an
oral pronouncement made by the District Court is not a final, appealable order.
Moreoeven the Hyde Park Cit\ nuisance ordinance in not unconstitutionalh vague
nor does it conflict with state statutes. Finally. Mr. Davis has failed to overcome
the presumption of constitutionality regarding the Justice Court structure as well

J

as the nuisance ordinance and penalty. Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Davis'
appeal must be denied.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION
OVER THIS CASE BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT HAS NOT
ISSUED A FINAL ORDER ON APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS PENDING ACTION AND MOTION TO QUASH
This Court lacks appellate jurisdiction because Mr. Davis has not appealed

a final order from the District Court. Rather, Davis has appealed the District
Courf s oral pronouncement denying Appellant's Motion to Dismiss Pending
Action and Motion to Quash (hereinafter "Motions^ or "Appellant*s Motions").
Under the well established final judgment rule, this Court only has appellate
jurisdictions over appeals of final orders and those eligible for certification under
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Mr. Davis' Appeal of the District Courf s oral
pronouncement does not satisfy the final judgment rule and must be dismissed.
The final judgment rule generally precludes a party from taking an appeal
from any orders that are not final. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. 817 P.2d 323,
325 (Utah 1991). Furthermore, the law uis well settled in the state that the
statements made b> a trial judge are not the judgment of the case and it is onl} the
signed judgment that prevails/* State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885. 887 (Utah 1978).
Appeals from oral pronouncements of the court are not properl} taken. Mackay
Co.. 817 P.2d at 325. When an order appealed from is not final and not certified or
eligible for certification, it is not properl} taken and the remedy is dismissal of the
appeal Id citing Crossland ^. Peck, 738 P.2d 631. 633 (Utah 1987).
4

"A judgment is final when it ends the controversy between the parties litigant."
Kennedy v. New Era Industries, lnc, 600 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979).
Mr. Davis has not appealed a final judgment nor has the District Court's
oral pronouncement been certified under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).
Rather, contrary to the final judgment rule, Davis has appealed an oral
pronouncement given by the District Court during a hearing held on July 30, 2007.
(Record P. 141). In particular, Mr. Davis seeks to appeal the District Court's oral
denial of his motions. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 53, ^ 2).
While Mr. Davis may suggest that the September 28, 2007, trial judgment
is the final order, this should not be the case because Davis's constitutional claims
were not ruled upon in the trial and said claims remained open for further
adjudication based upon Davis' own action. After the September 28, 2007 trial,
Mr. Davis continued to seek adjudication of the constitutional issues at the District
Court. As late as March 5, 2008, Mr. Davis filed a Notice to Submit for Decision
on his earlier filed objection to the constitutional claims pronouncement. (Record
P. 177). The District Court had earlier directed Hyde Park City to take further
action in the case by drafting an order on Davis* Motions. (See Appellant's Brief,
pp. 53-54, ^|103). The proposed order was objected to by Mr. Davis and thus
never signed by the District Court. (See Appellant's Brief pp. 53-54. ^ 103: See.
also. Record P. 145). Davis* objections to the proposed order were to have been
addressed before a final order could be entered.

If the court had reconsidered its position with respect to the constitutional
claims after receiving Mr. Davis* Notice to Submit for Ruling, it would have
caused the Davis appeal to become moot. Clearly, Davis himself believed that the
controversy regarding the constitutional issues was alive, and had not been
resolved by the court because he was asking the court to readjust its oral ruling1
before issuance of the signed order. (See Record P. 177). Again, this action was
occurring nearly five months after filing the first notice of appeal.
Accordingly, because the District Court's oral pronouncement denying the
constitutional claims was not reduced to a written order, and because the
September 28. 2007 trial judgment on Davis' nuisance violation did not address or
resolve the pending constitutional claims, there is not a final order in this case.
Mr. Davis' appeal is not properly taken and must be dismissed.
II.

ALL ORDINANCES ARE PRESUMED CONSTITUTIONAL. THE
DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO PROVE THE CITY NUISANCE
ORDINANCE IS OTHERWISE.
Mr. Davis' next argument is based on a claim that the Hyde Park City

nuisance ordinance is unconstitutional. It is essential to begin this response with
two well-established, basic principles, courts follow when reviewing the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. The first principle was restated in State
v. Willis. 100 P.3d 1218, 1219; 2004 UT 93 (Utah 2004), where the Utah Supreme
Court affirmed that. u[w]hen addressing a constitutional challenge to a statute, we

"Trial courts have clear discretion to reconsider and change their position with
respect to am orders or decision as long as no final judgment has been rendered/*
U.P.C., Inc. \. R.O.C. Gen.. Inc.. 990 ?2d 945. 945 (Utah Ct App. 1999)
6

presume that the statute is valid and resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality. (Emphasis added.) The second principle is found restated in
Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom. 73 P.3d 334. 339; 2003 UT 26. \\ 8 (Utah 2003). In
Midvale the Utah Supreme Court cautioned that courts should be ^reluctant to
entertain facial attacks because the statute [or ordinance] ma)' be declared
unconstitutional in all instances. The usual approach is to wait until a statute is
applied in the suspected and offensive way." Mr. Davis* attack of the cit) nuisance
ordinance is facial rather than in its application.
Normally in criminal cases the prosecution has the burden of proof.
However, following Willis. Appellant in the immediate case has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of constitutionality and proving that the ordinance is
defective. This Court should avoid holding the city nuisance ordinance
unconstitutional unless the Appellant's claim is so clear that it overcomes the long
standing presumption of constitutionality. Further, according to Midvale City,
even if this Court has some question regarding the constitutionality of the
ordinance, it should be reluctant to find it unconstitutional until after it can review
the ordinance as against the facts of the immediate case. Hyde Park City submits
that the ordinance is constitutional. Mr. Davis has no law to the contrar). He
cannot overcome the presumption of validity here. The ordinance in question was
drafted by a team associated with the Utah League of Cities and Towns and
presented to all municipalities as part of a model ordinance more than 30 years
ago The same language found in the Hyde Park nuisance ordinance has been
7

enacted by most cities and towns across the state. And used in untold numbers of
prosecutions. Despite all this, in a memorandum where Appellant cites to dozens
of cases, that are largely off-point they do not refer to a single case that questions
the constitutionality of this model nuisance ordinance.
The ordinance is constitutional.
III.

THE CITY NUISANCE ORDINANCE IS NOT IN CONFLICT
WITH STATE STATUTES. IN FACT, IT IS SPECIFICALLY
AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTE.
Mr. Davis' alleges, based upon a constitutional challenge, that the city

nuisance ordinance impermeably conflicts with the state nuisance statute. This
assertion is not grounded in fact or law. Utah law specifically authorizes cities,
such as Hyde Park, to define nuisances and enforce the same.
U.C.A. § 10-8-84(1) provides that wThe municipal legislative body may
pass all ordinances and rules, and make all regulations, not repugnant to law,
necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all powers and duties conferred
by this chapter, and as are necessary and proper to provide for the safety and
preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and
good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for the
protection of property in the city/*
U.C.A. § 10-8-84(1). quoted above, is a general statement granting
authority to cities to pass ordinances such as the city's nuisance ordinance. But
directh on point. U.C.A. § 10-8-60 is a specific statuton grant of authorit) to
cities to pass nuisance ordinances as the}' deem fit. U.C.A. § 10-8-60 provides
8

that cities "'may declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate the same, and impose
fines upon persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist/* The
state statute does not say that cities may enforce the state's definition of
nuisance—it directly states that cities may declare what shall be a nuisance in their
city.
It is true, as Davis alleges, but completely immaterial here, that Utah
statutes. U.C.A. § 76-10-801, 802. 803 and 78-38-9, define a "nuisance" or
"public nuisance" differently than the city defines a "nuisance." Because, as set
forth above, U.C.A. § 10-8-60provides express authority to cities to "declare
what shall be a nuisance. "
Davis cites to several Utah cases in an attempt to support his allegation that
the City ordinance is in conflict with state law. All of these cases are completely
off-point.
The first case cited by Davis is Allgood v. Larson, 545 P.2d 530 (Utah
1976). Contrary to Davis' assertion, Allgood stands for the proposition that where
the state and cit)7 both define the same conduct as a criminal offense, the "city
cannot impose a greater sentence than that provided by state law . . . ." Id. at 530.
In the immediate case, the cit}7 ordinance does not impose a greater sentence for
violating the cit} nuisance ordinance than is imposed for a violation of the state
nuisance statute. Allgood is inapplicable to the immediate case.
The second case Davis cites to is Richfield Cifr v. Walker. 790 P.2d 87
(Utah App. 1990). Again, this case does not suggest the Cit} nuisance ordinance is
9

in conflict with state law. In Richfield City, the Court of Appeals reviewed a case
where the defendant was prosecuted for a DUl. The facts in Richfield City are that
the defendant was found in actual physical control of his vehicle in the parking lot
of a hotel with a blood alcohol level of .21 percent. The issue on appeal was to the
language of the city ordinance Walker was prosecuted under. When originally
adopted, the city ordinance was identical to the controlling state statute. However,
subsequent to the city's enactment, the Utah Legislature amended the controlling,
state DUl, statute. Richfield City did not correspondingly amend its ordinance.
Consequently, at the time Walker was prosecuted under the city ordinance, it was
not identical to the controlling state statute. Nevertheless, the court held that the
city "ordinance need not be identical to the controlling state statute to be
consistent with it'* and upheld Walker's conviction. Id. at 90. Although this case
is more likely to support the prosecution's position in the immediate case, it is
largely inapplicable. Richfield City presents a situation where a controlling state
statute is compared to a subordinate city ordinance. There is no controlling state
statute in the immediate case. U.C.A. § 10-8-60 specificall) provides that cities
"may declare what shall be a nuisance." City's have never been given the authorit}
to define what shall be a DUl.
The next two cases cited b} Mr. Davis are not criminal cases but rather
civil. Cannon v. Neuberger. 268 P.2d 425 (Utah 1954) is a case where the plaintiff
brought a nuisance lav suit against his neighbor seeking an order of the court
requiring the defendant to top and trim three Carolina Poplar trees and two
10

Siberian Elm trees. Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining. 262 P. 269 (Utah 1927) is a case
where the plaintiff brought a nuisance law suit seeking damages to his home on
account of the gases, odors and fumes that drifted from the oil refiner}' onto
plaintiffs property and rendered it uncomfortable and undesirable for residence
purposes. In the former case, the court upheld the finding of nuisance; in the later,
the court ordered a new trial. The undersigned fails to see the relevance of these
cases to the allegation that the Hyde Park City ordinance is in conflict with state
law. The next cases cited by defendants are similar and go to factual issues rather
than legal. They are not relevant to Davis' appeal. They do not provide any
guidance as to whether the city ordinance is in conflict with state law.
Based on clear statutory authority. Hyde Park has the right to define what a
nuisance is even if its definition is dissimilar to the state definition of nuisance.
Mr. Davis' appeal, as based on conflict with state law, should be rejected.
IV.

THE CITY NUISANCE ORDINANCE IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. THE ORDINANCE
ADEQUATELY DEFINES NUISANCE.
Mr. Davis set forth numerous maximums in his memorandum similar to the

following: "It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for
vagueness if its prohibition is not clearly defined." (See Appellant's Brief p. 23.
1143.) The city agrees with these various statements. However, the city disagrees
with the allegation that the city nuisance ordinance is vague. The ordinance clearl)7
defines what is prohibited.

11

It appears that the only case cited by Davis suggesting that the city nuisance
ordinance is void for vagueness is Jones v. Logan City, 428 P.2d 160; 19 Utah 2d
169 (Utah 1967). More so than the Davis* cases referred to above, this case is
completely off point. The facts in Jones are as follows: Logan City created a
Board of Condemnation. The Board was given authority from the City
Commission (City Council) to determine whether any building or structure
constituted a menace to public health or public safety. The City Commission did
not. in any manner, define what might be u a menace to public health or public
safety.'* Without any standards upon which the Board could base its findings, the
Board was left to use its complete subjective discretion to decide what constituted
Cw

a menace to public health or public safety.'* The Board determined that Jones*

house was a nuisance and ordered it to be demolished. On appeal the. LTtah
Supreme Court invalidated the city ordinance—not because it was
unconstitutionally vague, but rather because it constituted an unconstitutional
delegation of power from the City Commission to the Board of Condemnation.
The court held. Cw[w]e are of the opinion that the ordinance attempts to make an
unlawful delegation of power to the Cit) "s Board of Condemnation. We are of the
opinion that by reason of the delegation of powers by the Cit) Commission the
ordinance above referred to is invalid." Id. at 171.
The cit) nuisance ordinance is not vague on its face. The ordinance has
specific language defining what constitutes a nuisance and Jones ^. Logan Cits is
completeh inapplicable.
12

V.

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT AS TO PENALTY IS INACCURATE.
Mr. Davis" argument is that "the city cannot impose a greater sentence than

that provided by state law." (See Appellant's Brief at p. 28, ^|56.) The city's
response is simple, despite Appellant's insinuation, the city ordinance does not
allow for a sentence greater than allowed by state law or provided by the state
nuisance statutes. Davis' memorandum includes a discussion about the sentence
available under city ordinances but completely fails to mention the available
sentence under comparable state law or the state's specific grant of sentencing
authority to cities.
VI.

MR. DAVIS HAS FAILED TO OVERCOME THE
PRESUMPTION FAVORING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE JUSTICE COURT SYSTEM.
Mr. Davis* brief contains a lengthy discussion about justice courts, the

essence of which is a general allegation that justice is not found in the Justice
Court system. Davis first argues that the Justice Court structure violates the
separation of powers of the Utah Constitution. (See Appellant's Brief p. 40. ^60).
Davis further alleges that Justice Courts are not capable of rendering independent
decisions because they are controlled by the municipal corporations that will only
retain them so long as the fines they impose are financially remunerative to the
cities. (See Appellant's Brief p 33. ^j66). In making both arguments, Davis has
provided no evidential*}' support in favor of his conclusions and therefore cannot
overcome the presumption of constitutionality.

13

The Utah Supreme Court has held that for a party to succeed in making
claims that a justice court system is unconstitutional, it "would need to support
them with specific evidence and cogent legal argument." West Jordan Citv v.
Goodman, 135 P.3d 874, 883; 2006 UT 27 (Utah App 2006). The Courts have
consistently declined to address state constitutional claims that have been
inadequately briefed. See State v. Norris, 48 P.3d 872. 880 (Utah 2001); People v.
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1988). In reviewing a separation of powers
argument, the Court has applied a three part test to determine whether a law
violates separation of powers principals:

First, are the [actors] in question "charged with the exercise of power
properly belonging to" one of the three branches of government?
Second, is the function that the statute has given the [actors] one
"appertaining to" another branch of government? The third and final
step in the analysis asks: if the answer to both of the above questions
is "yes/* does the constitution "expressly" direct or permit exercise of
the otherwise forbidden function? If not. article V. section 1 is
transgressed.
West Jordan City v. Goodman, 135 P.3d 874, 881 (Utah 2006)(citing Jones \ .
Utah Bd. Of Pardons & Parole. 2004 UT 53, ^ 23. 94 P.3d 283)).

The Utah Supreme Court considered identical claims to those of Mr. Davis
in West Jordan City v. Goodman. In that matter. Defendant Christopher Goodman
alleged that the West Jordan Justice Court structure violated the separation of
powers principal of the Utah Constitution. Id. Second, he claimed that the Judges
in that matter had an inherent conflict of interest because the\ were controlled b\
the cities that benefited from the fines the\ imposed. Id The Utah Supreme Court
14

affirmed the lower court's ruling because the Defendant had failed to offer factual
support other than "mere speculation" regarding the claims. The Court held:
In short Goodman fails to explain why or how he believes the
district court erred. These deficiencies in Goodman's briefing,
coupled with the presumption that statues passed by the legislature
are constitutional require that we affirm the ruling of the district
court of Goodman's separation of powers claim. We also affirm the
district court's ruling rejecting Goodman's claim that Judge Kunz
has a conflict of interest in every case because Goodman failed to
establish the factual predicate for this claim. Goodman offered only
three pieces of evidence to the district court. As the district court
found, however, none of this evidence established an actual conflict
of interest.
Id, at 882.
In the instant case, Davis has provided no legal precedent, or analysis to
indicate why he should prevail. The bulk of Mr. Davis' discussion draws upon
broad conclusions wholly absent in fact. Davis cites to newspaper editorials and
county council minutes regarding a criminal justice assessment conducted in Salt
Lake County (See Appellant's Brief at pp 35-37, y70, ^}75). It is interesting to
note, that the stated purpose of the county assessment was to find ways to reduce
the current and future jail population in Salt Lake County. (See Appellant's Brief
Appendix VV. Page 1). To say nothing of the unreliable and unauthenticated
nature of these documents themselves, the record is devoid of grounds as to why
the assessment conclusions or editorials would be applicable in the present case.
Like Goodman. Mr. Davis makes unsubstantiated claims that Utah Justice
Courts are profitable and concludes therefore that a constitutional violation has
occurred. However, unlike the Goodman case. Davis candidh acknowledges that
15

he has no factual basis to suggest that the Hyde Park Justice court falls within the
scope of the allegations: "Defendant/Appellant does not and cannot allege that the
justice court judge is actually influenced by the fact that he is beholden to the
City's leaders" (See Appellant's Brief p. 47 T|93). Emphasis Added.
Because Davis does not acknowledge the controlling test set forth in
Goodman, or provide an)7 facts from the record that would support his
conclusions, he fails to overcome the presumption that the justice court system is
constitutional.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT AND THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT
EXCEED THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE AS ALLOWED BY STATE
LAW.
Davis argues that the $50 fine imposed by the District Court was at odds

with the powers extended to cities and towns and was therefore repugnant to law.
(See Appellant's Brief p. 52, ^J 101). Mr. Davis does not elucidate his argument or
application further. As discussed earlier in this brief, U.C.A. § 10-8-60 allows the
cities to declare "what shall be a nuisance, and abate the same, and impose fines
upon persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist." Because the
Hyde Park City ordinance does not exceed the penalty allowed b} state statue, and
because the fine imposed upon the Davis was only $50.00, there is no violation.

16

CONCLUSION
This Court should deny relief requested in Mr. Davis" appeal. The District Court
has not entered a final order on Mr. Davis' constitutional claims. The city nuisance
ordinance and justice court is constitutional and nothing presented in Appellant's
memorandum overcomes the long-standing presumption of constitutionality as to the city
ordinance or the structure of the justice court.

Respectfully submitted this 18th of December, 2008
DAINES & WYATT. LLP
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On December 18, 2008.1 hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee was delivered by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail to:
A.W. Lauritzen
135 North Main Street, Suite 104
Logan, Utah 84321
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10-8-60
Title 10 - Utah Municipal Code
Chapter 08 - Powers and Duties of AH Cities

10-8-60. Nuisances.
They may declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate the same,
upon persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist.
No Change Since 1953

20

10-8-84
Title 10 - Utah Municipal Code
Chapter 08 - Powers and Duties of All Cities

10-8-84. Ordinances, rules, and regulations — Passage — Penalties.
IHTML

(1) The municipal legislative body may pass all ordinances and rules, and makdpElf1
regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or discharging gHord
powers and duties conferred by this chapter, and as are necessary and proper to provide
for the safety and preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace and good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for
the protection of property in the city.
(2) The municipal legislative body may enforce obedience to the ordinances with
fines or penalties in accordance with Section 10-3-703.
Amended by Chapter 323, 2000 General Session

21

76-10-801
Title 76 - Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 10 - Offenses Against Public Health, Safety, Welfare, and Morals

76-10-801. "Nuisance" defined -- Violation -- Classification of offense.
(HTML

(1) A nuisance is any item, thing, manner, condition whatsoever that is dangerkff
to human life or health or renders soil, air, water, or food impure or unwholesome. [Word
(2) Any person, whether as owner, agent, or occupant who creates, aids in creating,
or contributes to a nuisance, or who supports, continues, or retains a nuisance, is guilty
of a class B misdemeanor.
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session
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76-10-802
Title 76 - Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 10 - Offenses Against Public Health, Safety, Welfare, and Morals

76-10-802. Befouling waters.
[HTML

A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he:

PDF
Word
(1) Constructs or maintains a corral, sheep pen, goat pen, stable, pigpen, chicken
coop, or other offensive yard or outhouse where the waste or drainage therefrom shall
flow directly into the waters of any stream, well, or spring of water used for domestic
purposes; or
(2) Deposits, piles, unloads, or leaves any manure heap, offensive rubbish, or the
carcass of any dead animal where the waste or drainage therefrom will flow directly into
the waters of any stream, well, or spring of water used for domestic purposes; or
(3) Dips or washes sheep in any stream, or constructs, maintains, or uses any pool
or dipping vat for dipping or washing sheep in such close proximity to any stream used
by the inhabitants of any city or town for domestic purposes as to make the waters
thereof impure or unwholesome; or
(4) Constructs or maintains any corral, yard, or vat to be used for the purpose of
shearing or dipping sheep within twelve miles of any city or town, where the refuse or
filth from the corral or yard would naturally find its way into any stream of water used
by the inhabitants of any city or town for domestic purposes; or
(5) Establishes and maintains any corral, camp, or bedding place for the purpose of
herding, holding, or keeping any cattle, horses, sheep, goats, or hogs within seven miles
of any city or town, where the refuse or filth from the corral, camp, or bedding place will
naturally find its way into any stream of water used by the inhabitants of any city or
town for domestic purposes.
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session
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76-10-803
Title 76 - Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 10 - Offenses Against Public Health, Safety, Welfare, and Morals

76-10-803. "Public nuisance" defined — Agricultural operations.
(HTML

(1) A public nuisance is a crime against the order and economy of the state an<p>DF
consists in unlawfully doing any act or omitting to perform any duty, which act or JWord
omission:
(a) annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of three or
more persons;
(b) offends public decency;
(c) unlawfully interferes with, obstructs, or tends to obstruct, or renders dangerous
for passage, any lake, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or
highway;
(d) is a nuisance as defined in Section 78B-6-1107; or
(e) in any way renders three or more persons insecure in life or the use of property.
(2) An act which affects three or more persons in any of the ways specified in this
section is still a nuisance regardless of the extent to which the annoyance or damage
inflicted on individuals is unequal.
(3) (a) Agricultural operations that are consistent with sound agricultural practices
are presumed to be reasonable and do not constitute a public nuisance under
Subsection (1) unless the agricultural operation has a substantial adverse effect on the
public health and safety.
(b) Agricultural operations undertaken in conformity with federal, state, and local
laws and regulations, including zoning ordinances, are presumed to be operating within
sound agricultural practices.
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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78A-7-118
Title 78A - Judiciary and Judicial Administration
Chapter 07 - Justice Court

78A-7-118. Appeals from justice court — Trial or hearing de novo in
court.

HTML
PDF
Word

(1) In a criminal case, a defendant is entitled to a trial de novo in the district court
only if the defendant files a notice of appeal within 30 days of:
(a) sentencing after a bench or jury trial, or a plea of guilty in the justice court
resulting in a finding or verdict of guilt; or
(b) a plea of guilty in the justice court that is held in abeyance.
(2) If an appeal under Subsection (1) is of a plea entered pursuant to negotiation
with the prosecutor, and the defendant did not reserve the right to appeal as part of the
plea negotiation, the negotiation is voided by the appeal.
(3) A defendant convicted and sentenced in justice court is entitled to a hearing de
novo in the district court on the following matters, if he files a notice of appeal within 30
days of:
(a) an order revoking probation;
(b) an order entering a judgment of guilt pursuant to the person's failure to fulfil the
terms of a plea in abeyance agreement;
(c) a sentence entered pursuant to Subsection (3)(b); or
(d) an order denying a motion to withdraw a plea.
(4) The prosecutor is entitled to a hearing de novo in the district court on:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double jeopardy or
denial of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment holding invalid any part of a statute or ordinance;
(e) a pretrial order excluding evidence, when the prosecutor certifies that exclusion
of that evidence prevents continued prosecution; or
(f) an order granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest.
25

(5) Upon entering a decision in a hearing de novo, the district court shall remand
the case to the justice court unless:
(a) the decision results in immediate dismissal of the case;
(b) with agreement of the parties, the district court consents to retain jurisdiction;
or
(c) the defendant enters a plea of guilty in the district court.
(6) The district court shall retain jurisdiction over the case on trial de novo.
(7) The decision of the district court is final and may not be appealed unless the
district court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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78-38-4.7

JUDICIAL CODE

746

78-38-4.7.

Transportation of forest products or native
vegetation into or through the state.
Timber forest products, or native vegetation transported
into or through the state must be accompanied by a shipping
permit or proof of ownership.
n>H7

78-38-8. "Agricultural operation" defined.
As used in this act. "agricultural operation" means any
facility for the production for commercial purposes of crops
livestock, poultry, livestock products, or poultry products.

78-38-4.8. Exemptions.
The provisions of this chapter do not apply to the transpotv
Lation of:
(1) wood chips, sawdust, and bark;
(2j products transported by the owner of the property
or his agent from which the products were removed, or
(3) products for personal consumption incidental to
camping and picnicking which is limited to the amount:
(a; needed for the duration of the picnic or
campout; and
(In used at the campsite.
1987

78-38-9.

78-38-4.9. Violation as misdemeanor.
Violation of Sections 78-38-4.5 t h r o u g h 78-38-4.7 is a class B
misdemeanor.
1992
78-38-5.

Manufacturing facility in operation over
three years — Limited application of nuisance provisions.
(1) Notwithstanding Sections 78-38-1 and 76-10-803, no
manufacturing facility or the operation thereof shall be or
Decome a nuisance, private or public, by virtue of any changed
conditions in and about the locality thereof after the same has
oeen in operation for more than three years when such
manufacturing facility or the operation thereof was not a
auisance at the time the operation thereof began, provided,
the manufacturing facility does not increase the condition
asserted to be a nuisance and that the provisions of this
subsection shall not apply whenever a nuisance results from
the negligent or improper operation of any such manufacturing facility.
(2) The provisions of Subsection (1) of this section shall not
affect or defeat the right of any person to recover damages for
any injunes or damage sustained on account of any pollution
of. or change in the condition of, the waters of any stream or on
account of any overflow of the lands of any person.
(3) Any and all ordinances now or hereafter adopted by any
county or municipal corporation in which such manufacturing
facility is located, which makes the operation thereof a nuisance or providing for an abatement thereof as a nuisance in
the circumstances set forth in this section are null and void;
provided, however, that the provisions of this subsection shall
not apply whenever a nuisance results from the negligent or
improper- operation of any such manufacturing facility U)Hi
78-38-6. "Manufacturing facility" defined.
As used in this act. "manufacturing facility" means any
factory, plant, or other facility including its appurtenances,
where the form of raw materials, processed materials, commodities, or other physical objects LS converted or otherwise
changed into other materials, commodities, or physical objects
or where such materials commodities, or physical objects are
combined to form a new material, commodity, or physical
object
u)8i
78-38-7. A g r i c u l t u r a l o p e r a t i o n s — N u i s a n c e liability.
(1) Agricultural operations that are consistent with sound
agricultural practices are presumed to he reasonable and do
not constitute a nuisance unless the agricultural operation
has a substantial adverse effect on the public health and
safets
(2i Agricultural oocrations undertaken in conformity with
federal, state, and local laws ana regulations, including zoning
ordinances, arc presumed to be operating within sound agricultural practice^
1995

1981

Nuisance — Right of action to a b a t e nuisances
— Drug h o u s e s and drug d e a l i n g — Gambling
— Group criminal activity — Prostitution —
Weapons.
(1) Every building or place is a nuisance where:
(a) the unlawful sale, manufacture, service, storage-,
distribution, dispensing, or acquisition occurs of any controlled substance, precursor, or analog specified in Title
58, Chapter 37. Controlled Substances;
(b) gambling is permitted to be played, conducted, or
dealt upon as prohibited in Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 11;
Gambling, which creates the conditions of a nuisance as
defined in Subsection 78-38-1(1);
(c) criminal activity is committed in concert with two or
more persons as provided in Section 76-3-203.1;
(d) parties occur frequently which create the conditionsof a nuisance as defined in Subsection 78-38-1(1);
(e) prostitution or promotion of prostitution is regularly carried on by one or more persons as provided im*
Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13, Prostitution; and
(f) a violation of Title 76. Chapter 10, P a r t 5, Weapons;.,
occurs on the premises.
(2) It is a defense to nuisance under Subsection (l)(a) if the
defendant can prove that the defendant is lawfully entitledrto:'
possession of a controlled substance.
(3) Sections 78-38-10 through 78-38-16 govern only an£
abatement by eviction of the nuisance as defined in Subsections
i'l).

1999^

78-38-10. N u i s a n c e — Abatement by e v i c t i o n .
(1) Whenever there is reason to believe t h a t a nuisance
under Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16 is kept, maintained,
or exists in any count}', the county attorney of the county, the
city attorney of any incorporated city any citizen or citizens of.
the state residing in the county, or any corporation, partnership or business doing business in the county, in his or their"
own names, may maintain an action in a court of competent:
jurisdiction to abate the nuisance and obtain an order for the.
automatic eviction of the tenant.
(2) The court may designate a spokesperson of any group of
citizens who would otherwise have the right to maintain anaction in their individual names against the defendant underi m
fills section.
78-38-11. Abatement by eviction order — Grounds.
An order of abatement by eviction may issue only upon a~
showing by the applicant by a preponderance of the evidence
that:
(1) the applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless*
the order of abatement by eviction issues;
(2) the threatened injury to the applicant outweighs
whatever damage the proposed order of abatement y
eviction may cause the party so ordered;
.,
(3) the order of abatement by eviction, if issued, woul
not be adverse to the public interest; and
• ,
<4) there is a substantial likelihood that the aPP llca ?
will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, ° r
case presents serious issues on the merits which shoul
the subject of further litigation.
78-38-12.

P r i o r acts of t h r e a t s of v i o l e n c e — Protection
of w i t n e s s e s .
,
At the time of application lor abatement of the n u l s a r i C e f ( 0 f
eviction pursuant to Sections 78-38-10 and 78-38-11, ^P1"00*^
the exisyw'-p of {he nuisance depends, in whole or m P
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(e) a pretrial order excluding evidence, when the pros-117. Filing and docketing of a b s t r a c t
ecutor certifies that exclusion of that evidence prevents
) The judge, on the demand of a party in whose favor
continued prosecution; or
;ment is rendered, shall provide the party with an abstract
(f) an order granting a motion to withdraw a plea of
be judgment in substantially the form approved by the
guilty or no contest.
icial Council.
(5) Upon entering a decision in a hearing de novo, the
!) The abstract may be filed in the office of the clerk of the
district court shall remand the case to the justice court unless:
rict court of any county in the state but shall be docketed
(a) the decision results in immediate dismissal of the
he judgment docket of that district court.
case;
5) The clerk shall note the time of receipt of the abstract on '
(b) with agreement of the parties, the district court
abstract and on the docket.
1989
consents to retain jurisdiction; or
5-118. Execution on judgment.
(c) the defendant enters a plea of guilty in the district
rom the time of the docketing in the office of the clerk of
court.
r
district court execution may then be issued within the
(6) The district court shall retain jurisdiction over the case
le time, in the same manner, and with the same effect as if on trial de novo.
led on a judgment of the district court.
1989
(7) The decision of the district court is final and may not be
appealed unless the district court rules on the constitutional5-119. J u d g m e n t not a lien unless so recorded.
ity of a statute or ordinance.
2001 (ist.s.s.)
1) Except as provided under Subsection (3), a judgment
Ldered in a justice court does not create a lien upon any real
78-5-121. D o c k e t to be kept — E n u m e r a t i o n of entries
>perty of the judgment debtor unless the judgment or
required.
stract of the judgment:
Every justice court judge shall keep or cause to be kept a
(a) is recorded in the office of the county recorder of the docket. The following information shall be entered in thei
county in which the real property of the judgment debtor
docket under the title of the action to which it relates:
is located; and
(1) the title to every action or proceeding;
(b) contains the information identifying the judgment
(2) the object of the action or proceeding, and the
debtor as referred to in Subsection 78-22-1.5(4) either:
amount of any money claimed;
(i) in the judgment or abstract of judgment; or
(3) the date of the service of the summons and the time
(ii) as a separate information statement of the
of its return;
judgment creditor as referred to in Subsection 78-22(4) a statement of the fact if an order to arrest the'
1.5(5).
defendant is made or a writ of attachment is issued;
(2) The lien runs for eight years from the date the judgment
(5) the time when the parties or any party appears, or
as entered in the district court under Section 78-22-1 unless
a party's nonappearance, if default is made;
e judgment is earlier satisfied.
(6) minutes of the pleadings and motions in writing by;;
(3) State agencies are exempt from the recording requirereferring to them, and if not in writing, by a concise^
ent of Subsection (1).
2001
statement of the material parts of the pleadings;
(7) every adjournment, stating on whose application
}-5-120. Appeals from justice court — Trial or hearing
and to what time;
de novo in district court.
(8) a demand for a trial by jury, when made, by whom,^
(1) In a criminal case, a defendant is entitled to a trial de
and the order for the jury;
ovo in the district court only if the defendant files a notice of
(9) the time appointed for the return of the jury and for
ppeal within 30 days of:
the trial;
(a) sentencing after a bench or jury trial, or a plea of
(10) the names of the jurors who appear and are sworn;
guilty in the justice court resulting in a finding or verdict
(11) the names of all witnesses sworn and at whose
of guilt; or
request;
(b) a plea of guilty in the justice court that is held in
(12) the verdict of the jury and when received, or if theabeyance.
jury disagree and are discharged, the disagreement and
(2) If an appeal under Subsection (1) is of a plea entered
discharge;
)ursuant to negotiation with the prosecutor, and the defen(13) the judgment of the court including the costs
lant did not reserve the right to appeal as part of the plea
included and when entered;
legotiation, the negotiation is voided by the appeal.
(14) an itemized statement of the costs;
(3) A defendant convicted and sentenced in justice court is
(15) the time of issuing an execution and to whom, and
entitled to a hearing de novo in the district court on the
the time of any renewals;
following matters, if he files a notice of appeal within 30 days
(16) a statement of any money paid to the court, when,
±
and by whom; and
(a) an order revoking probation;
(17) the receipt of any notice of appeal, and of &$
(b) an order entering a judgment of guilt pursuant to
108e
appeal bond filed.
the person's failure to fulfil the terms of a plea in abeyance
agreement;
78-5-122. D o c k e t e n t r i e s — P r i m a facie e v i d e n c e .
(c) a sentence entered pursuant to Subsection (3)(b); or
Entries in a justice court judge's docket under Section
(d) an order denying a motion to withdraw a plea.
78-5-121, certified by the judge or his successor in office, are
]
(4) The prosecutor is entitled to a hearing de novo in the
prima facie evidence of the facts stated.
district court on:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
78-5-123. D o c k e t index.
Ajudge shall keep or cause to be kept an alphabetical ^ V
(b) an order arresting judgment;
to the names of the parties to each judgment in his docket w1
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a
a reference to the page of entry. The names of the parties so
finding of double jeopardy or denial of a speedy tnal;
be entered in the index by the first letter of the f a r D 2
(d) a judgment holding invalid any part of a statute or
i960
ordinance;
surname.
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